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Transparency and International Environmental 
Politics 
Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason 
Introduction 
Transparency is increasingly the subject of scrutiny and controversy in the social sciences 
(Florini, 2007; Graham, 2002; Gupta, 2008; Langley, 2001; Mol, 2008). The concept is linked to 
the most politically charged debates of our times, relating to due process and good governance, 
human rights, global security, and the need for oversight of markets in an era of unfettered 
globalization (Grigorescu, 2007; Lord, 2006; Roberts, 2004). In this chapter, we analyze the rise 
and effects of what we posit to be a ‘transparency turn’ in international environmental politics as 
well.<xen>
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</xen> A call for transparency increasingly informs actor expectations in a diverse 
array of environmental issue areas. Both state and non-state actors embrace transparency as a 
necessary feature of decision-making and/or regulatory action to address transboundary 
environmental problems. Diverse actors are championing transparency as a means to enhance 
efficiency, accountability, and/or effectiveness of international environmental policy outcomes. 
Furthermore, a wide range of governance modalities (informal, formal, voluntary, mandatory) 
call for disclosure, suggesting a malleability between transparency norms and diverse 
institutional forms of environmental governance that deserves more sustained theoretical and 
empirical attention. 
In much scholarship and policy practice, transparency is assumed to be a necessary 
precondition for more accountable, democratic, and effective policy and governance outcomes 
(Dingwerth, 2007; Dryzek, 1999; Held, 2004; Keohane, 2006). Yet, a growing number of 
transparency analysts are now revealing not only the promise but also the pathologies of relying 
on transparency to meet specific governance ends (Bannister and Connolly, 2011; Fung et al., 
2007; Hood and Heald, 2006; Lord, 2006). Such scholarship suggests that the ideal(s) of 
transparency might be contested or not attained in practice. There remains thus a compelling 
need to investigate the growing pervasiveness and implications of an embrace of transparency in 
international environmental politics, one that extends beyond state-led international 
environmental regimes (Mitchell, 1998), to include private and market-based governance as well 
(Langley, 2001). 
In doing so, a first step is to clarify how transparency is being conceptualized in diverse 
scholarly writings, and how we operationalize the concept in this chapter. Transparency is most 
often associated with openness and flows of information (Gilbert, 2007; Etzioni, 2011; Heald, 
2006; Mitchell, 2011). Etymologically, it refers to rendering visible (Michener and Bersch, 
2011). For purposes of this chapter, we conceptualize transparency as disclosure of information 
intended to evaluate and/or steer behavior. Our interest here is in the phenomenon of 
‘governance by disclosure’ (Gupta, 2008), by which we understand public and private 
governance initiatives that employ targeted disclosure of information as a way to evaluate and/or 
steer the behavior of selected actors. We view the proliferation of governance by disclosure in 
international environmental politics as clearly reflective of a transparency turn in this realm. 
Furthermore, such a transparency turn is ‘multidirectional’ (Michener and Bersch, 2011: 5), 
insofar as it is fueled by multiple architects and recipients of transparency, going beyond states to 
include corporations, civil society groups, international organizations, consumers, and citizens. 
Governance by disclosure initiatives in the international environmental domain include, 
for example, the multilaterally negotiated Aarhus Convention on the right to environmental 
information, where disclosure of environmental information from states is linked to a right to 
know and enhanced citizen participation and access to justice (Krämer, 2012; Mason, 2014). A 
range of prior-informed consent-based global treaties governing trade in restricted pesticides, 
hazardous waste, or genetically modified organisms (GMO) also seek to govern risk by 
furthering a right to know about global transfers of risky substances, and a right to choose 
whether to accept such transfers (Jansen and Dubois, 2014; Langlet, 2009). In addition, private 
eco-labeling schemes in forestry, fisheries, or the organic food sector rely on information 
disclosure to achieve a variety of governance ends, including empowering consumers to choose 
and improving sustainability performance (Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010; Dingwerth, 2007; 
Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010). Diverse corporate voluntary initiatives are also premised on the 
power of disclosure to achieve various ends, including the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
(calling for sustainability reporting by private corporations) or the NGO-led Publish What You 
Pay (calling for disclosure of revenue earnings by extractive industries operating in resource-rich 
developing countries) (Clapp, 2007; Pattberg and Onechi, 2009). Lastly, information disclosure 
is central to efforts by international organizations, such as the World Bank or the World Trade 
Organization, to improve accountability through disclosure (Roberts, 2002, 2004; Grigorescu, 
2007). 
All of the above initiatives vary greatly in terms of who is pushing for disclosure, from 
whom, and to what end. Notwithstanding these differences, underlying all of them is the 
fundamental presumption that information matters. If so, it becomes important to assess both the 
causes for a growing embrace of transparency and the effectiveness of governance by disclosure 
in a global context. We do so here by first reviewing diverse conceptual perspectives on 
transparency in international relations, distinguishing between institutionalist and critical 
theoretical perspectives, including relevant variants of each. We next advance an analytical 
framework for comparative assessment of the uptake, institutionalization, and effects of 
governance by disclosure in the international environmental realm. Section three briefly 
illustrates the evaluative prowess of this framework by applying it (selectively) to a diverse set of 
environmental governance by disclosure initiatives. In concluding, we put forward some general 
propositions about the prospects for transparency to improve the procedural quality and 
substantive outcomes of international environmental governance. We close by identifying areas 
for future research. 
Theorizing transparency: Conceptual perspectives 
Various strands of scholarly literature in comparative politics and international relations have 
analyzed the causes and consequences of an embrace of transparency in the international 
environmental realm. National-level legal and economic analyses of environmental policy were 
among the first to draw attention to what Ann Florini (1998) has labeled ‘regulation by 
revelation’ in specific developed country contexts (for example, Graham, 2002; Beierle, 2004; 
Fung et al., 2007; Gouldson, 2004; Konar and Cohen, 1997). Such scholarship has now 
expanded to generate insights about the diffusion and effects of right-to-know and access to 
information laws across the globe (for example, Florini, 2007). Such diffusion of transparency 
and disclosure norms and practices from industrialized to emerging economies– – notably 
pollution release and rating programs – has stimulated further comparative research on 
transparency and its link to policy outcomes (for example, Blackman et al., 2004; Garcia et al., 
2009; Gupta and Golder, 2005; Kathuria, 2009). This has been complemented by writings in 
international relations focusing on transparency’s effects in improving oversight of international 
financial markets and enhancing (or reducing) the prospects for global security (Best, 2005; 
Lord, 2006; Soederberg, 2001; Stasavage, 2003). 
Such analyses have been undertaken from both institutionalist and critical theoretical 
perspectives (see Paterson, this volume). In international relations scholarship, institutionalist 
perspectives have emphasized the importance of openness, communication, and information 
exchange as central to more effective and accountable (global) governance. The basic premise is 
that institutions – conceived as organized clusters of rule-making and collective behavior – can 
increase cooperation among states by correcting for information asymmetries and rationalizing 
decision-making (see, for example, Mitchell, 1998, 2011; Keohane, 2006). In research on 
international environmental politics, two strands of institutionalism – liberal institutionalism and 
rational institutionalism – have generated significant work on transparency. 
Liberal institutionalism (underpinning ‘international regime analysis’) posits that 
transparency in transboundary environmental rule-making promotes inter-state cooperation by 
rendering more open and publicizing shared interests and actor commitments (Konar and Cohen, 
1997; Stephan, 2002). The global institutionalization of information disclosure in the 
environmental realm ranges from multilateral obligations on notification and prior-informed 
consent in governing transfers of risky or hazardous substances, to the transnational diffusion of 
voluntary sustainability reporting standards. In analyzing such cases of transparency in 
international politics, liberal institutionalists are apt to attribute the lack of effective disclosure-
based governance to shortfalls of design or capacity, and concurrent failure to embed 
transparency within the decision contexts of both disclosers and recipients (Bauhr and 
Nasiritousi, 2012; Florini, 2007; Fung et al., 2007). This promotes a functionalist concern with 
institutional design and capacity-building relating to governance by disclosure mechanisms. 
Rational institutionalists view institutions as sets of incentives shaping the calculations of 
rational actors with regard to their environmental preferences. The nature and scope of 
institutionalized disclosure is argued to affect the payoff functions of polluters, whether these are 
firms (Garcia et al., 2009; Peck and Sinding, 2003) or states (Barrett, 2003; Bosetti et al., 2013). 
In this economistic approach to the role of transparency in politics, the structured disclosure of 
environmental information assures relevant actors that free-riding polluters are easier to identify 
and thereby sanction. Dysfunctionalities in transparency arise or are explainable by actor 
preferences being distorted or skewed by the disclosure of incomplete or unreliable data, or the 
lack of comparability, comprehensibility, or accessibility of environmental information. 
In contrast to institutionalism, a critical theoretical perspective on transparency 
emphasizes that its uptake, institutionalization and effects need to be analyzed within broader, 
often contested, political-economic and normative contexts within which disclosure is being 
deployed. Critical perspectives thus stress the historicity and socio-political conditioning of 
transparency and disclosure practices; and acknowledge the unavoidable normativity (value-
laden structure) of transparency. Two important strands of a critical perspective on transparency 
in international politics are constructivism and critical political economy. 
Constructivist analyses of science, knowledge, and information have long highlighted the 
changing authority and accountability relationships around the generation and sharing of 
information in governing transboundary environmental challenges (see Lövbrand, this volume). 
As writings in this vein suggest, current global environmental challenges, such as climate change 
or safe use of biotechnology, are characterized by fundamental normative and scientific 
uncertainties over what is valid knowledge and whose information counts. If so, agreeing on 
what is ‘more and better’ information, that is, on the scope and quality of information, is 
inevitably a matter of political conflict (Forsyth, 2003; Liftin, 1994; Jasanoff, 2004). Such 
insights are centrally relevant to the study of governance by disclosure. They suggest that the 
effects of disclosure depend not on reducing information asymmetries, and hence promoting 
more rational outcomes, but rather on whose information counts and is accorded primacy. From 
such a perspective, transparency itself is contested political terrain, whereby the very process of 
negotiating the scope and practices of disclosure serves to selectively frame and hence constitute 
the object of governance (Jasanoff, 2004; Gupta et al., 2014). 
Critical political economy perspectives (for example, Clapp, 2007; Clapp and Helleiner, 
2012; Levy and Newell, 2005; Newell, 2008a, 2008b; Stevis and Assetto, 2001) constitute 
another important lens into the uptake, institutionalization, and effects of transparency in 
international politics. These perspectives emphasize the current dominance in international 
environmental politics of what Steven Bernstein (2001) labels ‘liberal environmentalism’ – an 
authoritative complex of norms framing environmental governance challenges according to 
market liberal rights and values. From this perspective, transparency’s uptake and effects in 
international environmental politics need to be understood within a broader (unequal) political 
economic context, one in which private actors have a major role both in shaping and deploying 
public modes of information disclosure. Given the global policy currency of liberal 
environmentalism, critical political economy posits that transparency, if adopted, will have 
minimal market-restricting effects. 
Such a critical take acknowledges that transparency may reproduce rather than disrupt 
socially and ecologically harmful concentrations of public and private power. This is of 
particular relevance to an analysis of transparency in a global context, characterized by North–
South disparities in the capacities to demand disclosure, and to access and use disclosed 
information. It points as well to a paradox of the transparency turn in global politics: that in 
certain instances, the desired quality and quantity of disclosed information (such as its breadth, 
comparability, comprehensibility, comprehensiveness, or accessibility) follows upon rather than 
precipitates changes in the broader normative and political context. Thus, greater levels of 
actionable transparency may only be obtainable after broader democratic, participatory, and 
environmental sustainability gains are secured in a given context, rather than being the cause for 
such gains (Florini and Saleem, 2011; Gupta, 2010b). This leaves open a fundamental question: 
is transparency epiphenomenal? Even as transparency becomes ubiquitous in global 
environmental governance, its transformative potential remains uncertain and contingent. 
As one approach to assessing transparency’s transformative potential systematically, we 
outline below an analytical framework with which to explain the uptake and institutionalization 
of governance by disclosure in specific instances, and evaluate its effectiveness, with 
effectiveness understood both as improved procedural quality and enhanced substantive 
outcomes. This framework is informed by constructivist and critical political economy 
approaches, combined in what we label a ‘critical transparency studies’ perspective. 
Evaluating transparency: An analytical framework 
In this section, we advance an analytical framework that allows for (comparative) analysis of the 
application and shifting representations of transparency, as shaped by political-economic and 
geopolitical constellations of power. We draw on current thinking and debates to advance a set of 
propositions about the drivers of transparency’s uptake, its institutionalization and its varied 
effects in international environmental politics. 
Drivers of disclosure: Democratization and marketization 
As the varied literature on transparency to date has documented, a growing embrace of 
transparency in global politics is being stimulated, partly, by a rights-based democratic push for 
individual liberty, choice, and participation (Graham, 2002; Gupta, 2008; Mason, 2008). We 
label this a democratization driver, insofar as democratic forms of environmental governance 
seem to call for open and inclusive forms of collective choice. A democratization driver of 
transparency is seen to underpin, for example, the spread of ‘right to know’ and freedom of 
information laws in multiple national contexts over the last quarter century (Florini, 2007). 
This has now evolved, however, into a broader association of transparency with securing 
multidirectional accountability, and a more legitimate and democratic global polity (for example, 
Dingwerth, 2007; Keohane, 2006; Mason, 2005). Those positing such relationships assume that 
disclosure of relevant information is often a necessary step in holding actors to account for their 
(in-)actions according to set environmental standards. A reasonable expectation is that insofar as 
information is disclosed by those responsible for decisions that significantly affect the interests 
of others, such disclosure will facilitate individual and institutional answerability or even change. 
However, this involves assumptions about the capacity and responsiveness of particular actors, 
as well as the political systems within which they operate (Fox, 2007), including the assumption 
that democratic institutions foster greater accountability for environmental harm. 
A key question then becomes whether a democratic rationale for disclosure is significant 
in the growing uptake of transparency in the environmental domain, and whether it is necessarily 
liberal democratic. While there is a substantial literature on the relationship between democratic 
decision-making and ecological sustainability, much of it informed by theories of deliberative 
democracy (for example, Baber and Bartlett, 2005; Bäckstrand, 2010; Smith, 2003), the 
relationship between transparency and democratization remains less studied. 
Tensions arise from the fact that efforts to improve the democratic quality of 
environmental governance, through information disclosure,, often go hand-in-hand with a 
neoliberal privileging of market-based solutions to global sustainability challenges and ‘light 
touch’ regulation of the private sector (Gupta, 2010b; Mason, 2008, 2014). This can stimulate an 
uptake of market-based and voluntary transparency as a default option to avoid more stringent or 
costly governance pathways (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011). This marketization driver of disclosure 
can result in an embrace of transparency with minimal market restricting effects, and one that 
exempts corporate actors from stringent disclosure (Florini, 2008; Haufler, 2010). Alternatively, 
however, disclosure of (certain types of) information might well be seen as essential to the 
establishment and functioning of newly created markets in environmental goods and services, 
such as those for carbon or genetic resources. In such cases, transparency might be promoted by 
powerful actors, such as corporations and policy elites, as desirable and necessary in order to 
create and facilitate markets, rather than being perceived as a threat in its potential to restrict 
markets (in, for example, environmentally harmful products). 
A key element of a transparency research agenda thus consists of whether and how these 
two drivers of democratization and marketization shape uptake and institutionalization of 
transparency in the international environmental realm, and the extent to which they work in 
complementary or conflicting ways. 
Institutionalization of disclosure: Shifting sites of sovereign authority 
A democratization or marketization imperative for disclosure, and the ways in which these 
drivers intersect, necessarily shapes the institutionalization of transparency in specific instances. 
Distinctive regulatory possibilities and limits are created, depending upon whether disclosure is 
led by/solicited from public authorities or private actors. Following an extensive assessment of 
the institutionalization of information in governance, Mol (2008: 87–89) discerns, for example, a 
set of institutional tendencies in what he terms ‘informational governance’, notably a de-
centering of state-based regulation and opening up of political space for other (non-state) 
actors. Comparative in-depth case analysis is required to assess whether this indeed holds in the 
global environmental realm. In a given instance of governance by disclosure, the mapping out of 
institutionalization needs to identify the quantity (scope) and quality (attributes) of the disclosed 
information; the infrastructural designs steering the exchange of information between disclosers 
and recipients; and the role of information intermediaries in facilitating (or blocking) the 
usability and reach of environmental information. 
Much scholarly and policy attention has focused, for example, on attributes of disclosed 
information as being central to the success of transparency-based governance. These include 
whether disclosed information is (perceived to be) accessible, comprehensible, comparable, 
accurate, or relevant (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010), and whether it is standardized or non-
standardized. A related, increasingly important, development in transparency politics is the rise 
of information intermediaries or infrastructures that seek to validate or increase the utility of 
disclosed information for specific stakeholders (Etzioni, 2010; Fung et al., 2007; Graham, 2002; 
Gupta, 2008; Lord, 2006). These include auditors and verifiers of disclosed information, or civil 
society groups seeking to render disclosed information more user-friendly (see also Langley, 
2001 for an early and detailed discussion of this). Such new transparency ‘powerbrokers’ may 
produce shifts in the loci of authority and expertise in environmental governance that shape how 
disclosure will be institutionalized and the concurrent effects that it will produce. 
Effects of disclosure: Normative, procedural, and substantive 
In addition to identifying the drivers of disclosure and dynamics of institutionalization, assessing 
the effectiveness of disclosure-based governance is the third pillar of the analytical framework 
outlined here (see also Young, this volume). An evaluation of transparency’s effectiveness 
requires, however, prior conceptual clarity on distinct categories of effects. The effectiveness of 
traditional environmental regulatory instruments is often primarily assessed in terms of reduced 
environmental harm (EEA, 2001; Mitchell, 1998; Young, 1999). Yet the ends sought to be 
furthered by governance by disclosure are broader, requiring an analytical openness to a variety 
of effects. 
In line with this, we posit here three categories of effects: normative, procedural, and 
substantive. First, underlying most governance by disclosure initiatives is the normative rationale 
that recipients of information have a ‘right to know’ about damaging environmental behaviors or 
products (Beierle, 2004; Rowen-Robinson and Rothnie, 1996). Given the broad association of 
transparency with a right to know (for example, Florini, 2007), a goal to inform is thus a first 
step in embedding transparency entitlements within environmental governance. If so, the extent 
to which governance by disclosure furthers a right to know (and whose right to know) is an 
essential element in assessing its normative effectiveness. This requires analysis of whether a 
right to know is contested or not, and whether and how it is being institutionalized in practice in 
a given disclosure initiative. 
Going beyond a right to know, transparency is also closely associated, in multiple 
political and legal analyses, with procedural effects related to the quality of governance 
processes (Graham, 2002; Gupta, 2008; Stasavage, 2003; van den Burg, 2004; Keohane, 2006). 
The procedural goals of disclosure can thus include holding disclosers accountable, as well as 
enhancing participation or the informed choice of information recipients. Assessing the 
procedural effectiveness of governance by disclosure thus requires assessing the extent to which 
these goals are accepted, institutionalized and attained in practice. 
Finally, disclosure also aims for improved substantive outcomes, such as reduced 
emissions, risk mitigation and environmental improvements (for example, Gouldson, 2004; 
Stephan, 2002; Mitchell, 1998; Fung et al., 2007). A key example is the much-analyzed United 
States Toxic Release Inventory, where an ultimate goal of disclosure is reduced emissions of 
toxic pollutants (for example, Konar and Cohen, 1997). In global environmental governance, 
these substantive regulatory goals converge on the prevention or mitigation of significant 
transboundary environmental harm or harm to the global commons. Yet the link between 
transparency and environmental improvements remains both little examined and challenging to 
assess. This is related to long acknowledged causality challenges inherent in such assessments. It 
is also perhaps linked to a more dominant association of transparency with a procedural turn in 
environmental governance, whereby its empowerment potential (and link to accountable, 
participatory and legitimate governance) may often be privileged over its role in securing 
substantive environmental gains (for example, Rose-Ackermann and Halpaap, 2002, see also 
Gupta, 2008). Yet the relationship between transparency and substantive environmental 
improvements is ever more important to assess, insofar as disclosure might be relied upon, more 
so than previously, as an innovative means by which to secure (transboundary) environmental 
improvements in a neoliberal, marketized global governance context. 
In the next section, we analyze some of the issues briefly sketched above in an illustrative 
comparative empirical examination of a number of governance by disclosure initiatives in 
international environmental politics. 
Evaluating transparency: A comparative empirical 
assessment 
A critical transparency studies approach is amenable to multiple research methodologies. In this 
section, we briefly illustrate the merits of a comparative case study approach, as one that is 
particularly well suited to explaining the unfolding of transparency initiatives across diverse 
modalities of international environmental governance. In doing so, we touch upon four 
significant examples of governance by disclosure in international environmental politics – two 
state-led multilateral agreements (the Aarhus Convention and the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety) and two private voluntary disclosure initiatives (the Carbon Disclosure Initiative and 
the GRI). We select these cases to illustrative the multidirectional and hybrid (public-private) 
nature of transparency’s role and impact in international environmental politics. We first provide 
a brief introduction to each below. 
Aarhus convention 
The 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (henceforth Aarhus Convention) is the most far-
reaching expression in international environmental law of transparency and information 
disclosure norms. Negotiated under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, it 
codifies citizen rights to information access, public participation and access to justice in 
environmental matters. These are non-discriminatory entitlements for individual and civil society 
actors within and across the territories of all parties to the convention. The convention imposes 
mandatory information disclosure duties on public authorities, including both passive (request-
based) and active measures. Private entities are excluded from these provisions, although a 2003 
Protocol on Pollutant Releases and Transfer Registers indirectly creates disclosure obligations on 
private operators of relevant industrial facilities. An oft-noted characteristic of the Aarhus 
Convention is its innovative compliance mechanism, which includes rights of public actors to 
submit allegations of non-compliance to the convention compliance committee and launch 
liability claims against those alleged to be breaching any environmental law within the 
jurisdiction of an Aarhus member state. These rights strengthen the scope and depth of Aarhus 
obligations on information disclosure (Mason, 2014). 
Cartagena Pprotocol on Bbiosafety 
Negotiated under the auspices of the Convention on Biological Diversity, this multilateral 
agreement seeks to govern the safe transboundary transfer and use of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). Ensuring safe trade in GMOs is a controversial global anticipatory 
governance challenge, one where the very existence of risk remains contested, but also one 
where information disclosure is central to current global governance efforts. The Cartagena 
Protocol was negotiated at the insistence of developing countries who were concerned about the 
spread of novel genetically modified seed and crop varieties into their territories without their 
knowledge. They demanded the right to know about and choose whether to permit or restrict 
such transfers. The Cartagena Protocol thus calls for the advance informed agreement of an 
importing country prior to trade in some GMOs. It thus seeks to further an importing country’s 
normative right to know about entry into its borders of GMOs through labeling requirements, as 
well as the procedural and substantive goals of importer choice and regulatory oversight over 
GMOs (Clapp, 2007; Gupta, 2010a, 2010b). 
Carbon disclosure project 
In the realm of corporate social responsibility, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is arguably 
the most important voluntary mechanism advancing disclosure of corporate greenhouse gas 
emissions, energy use and, more recently, exposure to deforestation risks. Founded in 2001 by a 
non-profit organization based in London, the CDP represents a consortium of institutional 
investors holding, by 2013, $87 trillion of assets (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013). The CDP’s 
core disclosure-based climate governance strategy revolves around an annual questionnaire to be 
completed by the world’s largest companies that requests information on climate-related risks 
and opportunities, and their carbon management strategies. There is now a substantial level of 
reporting: according to the CDP; over 3,000 companies responded to the 2011 questionnaire, 
including 81 per cent of the Global 500 (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013). Individual public 
responses to the questionnaire are available on the CDP website, although CDP signatories, as 
investor members, can benefit from advanced comparative analysis of reported data. The CDP 
has been the focus of much international environmental governance research recently (for 
example, Kolk et al., 2008; Newell and Paterson, 2010; Knox Hayes and Levy, 2014). 
Global Reporting Initiative 
The GRI is a quintessential example of voluntary, private governance by disclosure in the 
international environmental realm. It consists of an extensive global multi-stakeholder effort to 
produce detailed guidelines for sustainability reporting by private companies. It is one of the 
longest established and most broad ranging corporate sustainability disclosure initiatives now in 
place. It is also of growing interest to scholars of corporate social responsibility and private 
(transnational) governance (for example, Clapp, 2007; Dingwerth, 2007; Pattberg and Enechi, 
2009). Emerging research on the GRI suggests that, notwithstanding elaborate, time consuming 
and resource intensive efforts to generate large amounts of sustainability data and disclose it, its 
utility to intended beneficiaries is often minimal (for example, Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010). 
Space constraints preclude a full application of our analytical framework to each of the 
four cases noted above. In what follows, we focus on two specific elements of our framework: 
first, whether and how the institutionalization of transparency in each case decenters state-led 
regulation; and second, the normative, procedural and substantive effects of such governance by 
disclosure initiatives in the international environmental realm. 
Institutionalizing governance by disclosure: Decentering state-led 
regulation? 
For the multilateral disclosure regimes represented by the Aarhus Convention and the Cartagena 
Protocol, the institutionalization of disclosure reveals limits on usable disclosure by recipients in 
each case (for detailed analyses of these two cases, see Gupta, 2014; Mason, 2014). The manner 
of institutionalization in each case indicates, furthermore, a partial confirmation of the 
proposition advanced in the previous section, that transparency might decenter state-led 
regulation and open up political space for other actors. An analysis of institutionalized disclosure 
in these cases indicates that transparency qualifies state sovereign authority but does not 
necessarily weaken it. In one sense, this is no more than the familiar pooling of state sovereign 
powers well established in public international law. Transparency-based international regimes 
create state entitlements and duties based on the voluntary consent of parties to a treaty. This is 
reflected as well in the general access to information provisions in the Aarhus Convention, and 
the more specific disclosure rules on GMOs in the Cartagena Protocol. 
This said, however, the propensity of states to adopt multilateral transparency norms and 
rules reflects their sensitivity to perceived domestic and external impacts on sovereign authority, 
constituting a geopolitics of information disclosure that reflects power differentials within and 
between developed and developing countries. This reveals, as well, a need to differentiate 
between types of states in assessing impacts of institutionalized disclosure on state-led regulation 
and authority. One conspicuous institutional logic running through the two examples evoked 
here is that of developed countries promoting global diffusion of transparency rules with high 
policy currency in their domestic contexts. This is evident from the diffusion of pollutant release 
and transfer registers (Aarhus Convention); and from the specific limits on global GMO-related 
disclosure resulting from market liberal property rights norms and rules dominant in GMO 
exporting countries (Cartagena Protocol). 
Furthermore, the institutionalization of transparency in such state-led disclosure 
arrangements is also inflected by private authority, and is shaped by a dominant marketization 
impetus underpinning transparency’s institutionalization in international environmental politics. 
In the case of the Aarhus Convention, private enterprises are excluded from its mandatory 
information disclosure duties, which fall on public authorities, although pollution and release and 
transfer registers create indirect obligations on private operators. In the Cartagena Protocol, the 
major weight given to the caveat emptor (buyer beware) dictum in regulatory choices about 
GMOs puts poorer (GMO importing) countries at a disadvantage in their attempts to be informed 
about and mitigate risks relating to GMO imports. Similarly, the protocol’s disclosure 
obligations are limited to information that is already known to exporters, ensuring that existing 
market practices do not have to change to comply with this global disclosure-based regime. 
Again, however, this effect varies by differential state power, as more powerful countries and 
trading blocs (such as the EU) can force GMO exporting countries to generate and disclose new 
information, typically by bypassing the Cartagena Protocol in favor of unilateral measures. 
For the voluntary sustainability disclosure yielded by the GRI and the Carbon Disclosure 
Project, an original democratization impetus for transparency in both cases is again skewed in 
practice by a more dominant marketization imperative driving institutionalization of disclosure. 
There is ongoing bargaining between non-state rule-makers and corporate disclosers over the 
quantity and quality of disclosed information; for example, there are significant tensions between 
the corporate comparability goal of the GRI and the discretion allowed companies to incentivize 
their self-reporting. There is also an important trend for sustainability reporting to become 
commodified: the Carbon Disclosure Project and GRI have, directly or indirectly (via 
commercial intermediaries), generated extensive paywalls behind which enhanced interpretive 
products are available, weakening their public transparency claims (Knox Hayes and Levy, 2014; 
Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2014). 
In sum, the discussion above indicates a general finding across the cases with regard to 
drivers of disclosure and its institutionalization: that a marketization driver of transparency’s 
uptake dominates, even as it contributes to a reconfiguring (rather than necessarily a weakening) 
of state sovereign authority. We turn next to the effects of disclosure-based governance. 
Effectiveness of governance by disclosure: Normative, procedural and 
substantive effects 
To recall, we propose a broad typology of effectiveness in order to capture a range of (potential) 
effects attributable to transparency-based governance – normative, procedural, and substantive. 
We address below whether such effects are being realized in the cases discussed. 
Normative effects: The normative aim of governance by disclosure is ensuring the ‘right 
to know’ about environmental performance and/or harm, geared mainly to civil society recipients 
but also to states and corporate actors. For individuals (as citizens or consumers), the moral 
authority infusing the right to know is closely affiliated with democracy and participation. Its 
strongest legal expression in international environmental politics is in the access to information 
entitlement of the Aarhus Convention, where it attains the status of a cosmopolitan human right. 
While the right-to-know also features prominently in other governance by disclosure initiatives, 
it is either restricted to national settings (for example, domestic right-to-know laws); subsumed 
within problem-specific treaty entitlements (for example, Cartagena Protocol); or facilitated in 
actor- and sector-specific domains by civil society organizations (for example, CDP and GRI). 
Across all these manifestations – including Aarhus rights – the public right to know is, 
however, restrained or diluted by countervailing norms, unsettling its governance legitimacy. 
The most potent are moral and legal norms underpinning the private authority of actors in market 
liberal systems of resource allocation; thus, we encounter environmental disclosure obligations 
constrained by corporate voluntarism (non-financial reporting systems), commercial 
confidentiality (Aarhus Convention), or the caveat emptor (‘buyer beware’) dictum (GMOs). 
In summary, while right-to-know serves as a widely accepted normative justification of 
transparency in international environmental politics, its legal application tends to be 
compromised by the political deployment of market liberal or state sovereign norms. 
Procedural effects: The procedural goals of transparency in environmental governance 
include empowering information recipients to perform meaningful governance roles, notably 
holding disclosers accountable and making choices that are more informed. Comparative 
analysis of the disclosure initiatives noted above suggests, however, that little sustained 
empowerment of intended information recipients is occurring to date in the cases examined. 
The Aarhus Convention has arguably made the greatest legal progress with transnational 
public entitlements to environmental information and non-compliance notifications, as a way to 
empower. Yet there have been repeated procedural blockages by convention parties to public 
information requests, and this opposition is often justified in relation to the discretion allowed 
parties when implementing treaty obligations. The formal procedural rights for public actors 
created by the Aarhus Convention are, furthermore, not necessarily mirrored in the disclosure 
regime for global biosafety governance, whereby a holding to account by importing countries is 
rendered difficult by the limited disclosure obligations placed on those exporting potential risk. 
Procedural shortcomings concerning access to information by civil society actors are also 
apparent in voluntary environmental reporting, where civil society actors are intended to be 
either a primary or secondary recipient of information. The claim that these initiatives share – 
that disclosure is at least partly a means of public accountability – thus falls short in practice. For 
both the GRI and CDP, there are weaknesses in public participation both at the system 
governance level and in terms of the usability of disclosed information for accountability claim 
making. According to Knox Hayes and Levy (2014), these voluntary corporate disclosure 
systems are limited by their focus on managerial processes and lack of comparability across 
forms, as well as by the lack of sanctions for non-compliance. 
Substantive effects: Transparency and disclosure of environmental information can 
support substantive regulatory goals, such as reduced pollution emissions and the conservation of 
biodiversity. The direct substantive effect often attributed by proponents of disclosure is that the 
sharing of information will render producers of environmental damage or risk more responsive to 
regulatory pressures. Not surprisingly, the more process-oriented Aarhus convention does not 
contain substantive environmental standards, assuming instead that its substantive aims of 
improved environmental health and safety will flow from procedural openness, access to 
participation and justice. Other multilateral environmental agreements, including the Cartagena 
Protocol, are more centrally animated by harm prevention goals. Yet there are negligible treaty-
based data sources on the environmental effects of the relevant disclosure measures, for reasons 
that include evaluative uncertainties, measurement difficulties, and a preoccupation with trade 
rather than environmental outcomes. It is instructive that, in the GMO governance case, various 
countries have bypassed the Cartagena Protocol’s disclosure-based approach to governance by 
opting for unilateral moratoria or bans to achieve environmental and health protection goals. 
In the voluntary realm of sustainability reporting systems that focus on managerial 
processes, the evidence on substantive environmental effectiveness is also slight. Dingwerth and 
Eichinger (2014) note the rising number of corporate reports registered under the GRI, but 
caution that the lack of data specificity and comparability prevents any meaningful assessment of 
environmental performance patterns. Knox Hayes and Levy (2014) reach the same conclusion in 
relation to corporate carbon disclosure systems, which, they claim, do not appear to be shifting 
core product or marketing strategies in a low-carbon direction. As with mandatory governance 
by disclosure, the monitoring and analysis of environmental outcomes by voluntary disclosure 
systems is still in its infancy. 
Conclusions 
This chapter began with the proposition that there was a ‘transparency turn’ in international 
environmental politics, suggesting a need to systematically assess its drivers and effects. The 
overview of disclosure-based governance undertaken here allows us to conclude that information 
disclosure is becoming a widely accepted norm and practice in multilateral and transnational 
governance of environmental harm and improved sustainability performance. At the same time, 
any claims about the ‘rise and rise of transparency’ in international politics (Raab, 2008: 600) 
need to be tempered by acknowledgment of competing trends that restrict the scope of actionable 
disclosure. These can be related to commercial confidentiality, the particularities of a neoliberal 
context within which disclosure is being promoted, scientific unknowabilities and uncertainties, 
or even to limits on the desire of society to know about (production and distribution of) 
environmental harm (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010). The transparency turn in global 
environmental governance is thus evident but partial. 
This chapter has also highlighted the broader (contested) normative context that shapes 
the embrace of transparency by various actors, and its uneven institutionalization in the 
international environmental realm. As is evident from the empirical examples addressed here, 
struggles over the scope and practices of transparency are intensifying, and its effects are not 
necessarily positive in governance terms. The future research agenda of transparency studies 
then requires engaging, at the very least, with the rise of what Mol (2014) calls ‘reflexive 
transparency’ that is, secondary layers of disclosure necessary to render primary disclosure 
usable; as well as the infrastructures and powerbrokers of a transparency turn in governance. 
Such developments can only be understood by critically analysing transparency’s particular 
material and discursive contexts of application. Such an understanding is necessary to negotiate 
the multi-layered, contested realms of transparency-based international environmental politics. 
With regard to the legitimacy and effectiveness of such an approach to policy and 
governance, the relatively recent embrace of transparency as a regulatory tool cautions against a 
too quick dismissal of its potential to generate substantive environmental improvements. 
Furthermore, the transformative promise of governance by disclosure goes beyond substantive 
impacts to include normative and procedural effects as well. As indicated above, however, these 
effects are being circumscribed in practice by market liberal norms. This yields a proposition that 
requires further comparative assessment: that transparency-based governance may well face a 
legitimation deficit, insofar as it fails to fulfill its emancipatory and transformative potential. 
The sources of legitimacy underpinning transparency-based governance derive, as we 
have indicated in this chapter, partly from a democratization impetus to governance, creating 
expectations among domestic and transnational publics that information disclosure will facilitate 
accountability claims against state and non-state actors responsible for producing significant 
environmental harm. Disclosure-based governance also fosters political legitimacy insofar as it 
enriches public understanding of what is proper in relation to the collective decisions of 
(potential) harm producers. 
This notwithstanding, the inadvertent, indirect harm typically associated with 
transboundary environmental problems lends many governance by disclosure initiatives an air of 
experimentation concerning their intended substantive effects; and legitimacy becomes less 
feasible when expected from steering mechanisms coordinating dispersed decision-makers and 
affected publics. Furthermore, as the multidirectional character of governance by disclosure 
indicates, there remains a political struggle over legitimate arenas for disclosure rulemaking and 
implementation, across diverse contexts and across hybrid configurations of state and non-state 
authority. There are, to be sure, cogent suggestions that increasing transparency in both state-led 
(vertical) and non-state (horizontal) multi-level governance can increase political legitimacy, if 
fed into more inclusive, deliberative systems of decision-making (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007; 
Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011). However, it may also be that increasing transparency and 
information disclosure will instead amplify the current legitimation deficits in global 
environmental governance, by locating the systemic sources of harm production in broader 
relations of political and economic power (Newell, 2008a). It is in this sense that governance by 
disclosure might itself face a legitimation deficit. A question for future research remains then the 
conditions under which transparency-based governance can overcome such potential legitimation 
deficits and thereby fulfill its transformative potential. This would also be fruitful to assess 
comparatively vis-à-vis other international policy domains. 
Another aspect of such a future research agenda turns on the merits and attainability of 
‘full’ versus ‘partial’ transparency and the implications for policy and governance outcomes. In 
the policy domains of international finance, security and diplomacy, an oft-posed question turns 
on whether ‘full disclosure’ is necessary, feasible and/or desirable, in fulfilling the 
transformative potential of transparency. Most analyses conclude that complete disclosure in 
such areas is both unattainable and undesirable, given the merits of retaining varying degrees of 
secrecy, anonymity, or privacy in many instances (for example, Birchall, 2011; Lord, 2006). This 
raises, however, an intriguing question that we have only begun to touch upon in international 
environmental scholarship on transparency: how precisely is the (global) environmental realm 
distinct? The imperative to balance transparency with secrecy, privacy and anonymity arguably 
does not hold in this policy domain to the extent that it does in others, yet this has not been 
systematically analyzed. Future research could fruitfully shed light on the specific features of 
global environmental governance challenges that either impede full disclosure, or make its 
pursuit more or less desirable. It remains an important empirical question what the limits of full 
disclosure, and the merits and demerits of partial transparency in international environmental 
politics are, given the geopolitical and material contexts for such disclosure. 
Annotated bibliography 
Fung, A., M. Graham and D. Weil (2007) Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of 
Transparency (New York: Cambridge University Press). 
This important book is one of the first to examine whether transparency works as intended in a 
variety of policy fields, such as health, finance, education, national security and environmental 
pollution control. It introduces the concept of ‘targeted transparency’ and outlines conditions 
under which targeted disclosure of information can achieve desired aims. It is primarily 
concerned, however, with the national context of the United States, and deals almost exclusively 
with public transparency, that is its scope is government-mandated, national-level US 
transparency policies. 
Florini, A. (ed.) (2007) The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World (New York: 
Columbia University Press). 
This edited volume, compiled by a leading scholar of transparency studies, focuses on the 
diffusion of ‘right to know’ laws globally, and their functioning in diverse national contexts (for 
example, India, China, Nigeria) and across a range of institutional domains (for example, 
international financial institutions, the security sector, as well as environmental governance). 
Gupta, A. and M. Mason (eds) (Forthcoming 2014). Transparency in Global Environmental 
Governance: Critical Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
This is the first comprehensive examination of the nature and implications of a transparency turn 
in international environmental governance. It advances a ‘critical transparency studies’ lens to 
analyze whether transparency informs, empowers and improves environmental outcomes in this 
policy domain. It does so by bringing together ten in-depth case analyses of ‘governance by 
disclosure’, including both public and state-led and private voluntary disclosure initiatives in 
international environmental politics. 
Lord, K. (2006) The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency: Why the Information 
Revolution May not Lead to Security, Peace or Democracy (New York: SUNY Press). 
While not addressing environmental issues, this important contribution to transparency studies 
from political science and international relations offers a critical perspective on transparency, 
arguing that it is not the panacea that it is often assumed to be. Lord’s book focuses on the role of 
transparency in conflict resolution and international security, and on the potential harmful uses of 
transparency in these policy domains by authoritarian governments and non-state actors. 
Mol, A. (2008) Environmental Reform in the Information Age: The Contours of Informational 
Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press). 
This comprehensive treatment in environmental sociology explores how (global) environmental 
governance is changing under the conditions of the Information Age. Mol advances the concept 
of ‘informational governance’ here in examining how information is increasingly becoming 
central to globalized and multilevel and multi-actor networked environmental reform processes. 
Works Ccited 
Auld, G. and L. H. Gulbrandsen (2010) ‘Transparency in Nonstate Certification: Consequences 
for Accountability and Legitimacy’, Global Environmental Politics 10, 3, 97–119. 
Baber, W. F and R. V. Bartlett (2005) Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democracy and 
Ecological Rationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Bäckstrand, K. (2010) Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the 
Promise of New Modes of Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). 
Bannister, F. and R. Connolly (2011) ‘The Trouble with Transparency: A Critical View of 
Openness in e-Government’, Policy and Internet 3, 1, article 8. 
Barrett, S. (2003) Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Bauhr, M. and N. Nasiritousi (2012) ‘Resisting Transparency: Corruption, Legitimacy and the 
Quality of Global Environmental Politics’, Global Environmental Politics 12, 4, 9–29. 
Beierle, T. C. (2004) ‘The Benefits and Costs of Disclosing Information about Risks: What do 
we Know about Right-to-Know?’, Risk Analysis 24, 2, 335–346. 
Bernstein, S. (2001) The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press). 
Bernstein, S. and B. Cashore (2007) ‘Can Non-state Global Governance be Legitimate? An 
Analytical Framework’, Regulation and Governance 1, 4, 347–371. 
Best, J. (2005) The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). 
Bianchi, A. and A. Peters (eds) (2013) Transparency in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Birchall, C. (2011) ‘Introduction to “Secrecy and Transparency”: The Politics of Opacity and 
Openness’, Theory, Culture and Society 28, 7–8, 7–25. 
Blackman, A., S. Afsah and D. Ratunda (2004) ‘How Do Public Disclosure Pollution Control 
Programs Work? Evidence from Indonesia’, Human Ecology Review 11, 3, 235–246. 
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, E. De Cian and E. Mosetti (2013) ‘Incentives and Stability of 
International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment’, Energy Policy 55, 44–56. 
Carbon Disclosure Project (2013) ‘Climate Change Programme’, available at 
https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/Programmes/Pages/CDP-Investors.aspx 
Clapp, J. (2007) ‘Illegal GMO Releases and Corporate Responsibility: Questioning the 
Effectiveness of Voluntary Measures’, Ecological Economics 66, 2–3, 348–358. 
Clapp, J. and E. Helleiner (2012) ‘International Political Economy and the Environment: Back to 
the Basics?’, International Affairs 88, 3, 485–501. 
Dingwerth, K. (2007) The New Transnationalism: Transnational Governance and Democratic 
Legitimacy (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Dingwerth, K. and M. Eichinger (2010) ‘Tamed Transparency:How Information Disclosure 
Under the Global Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower’, Global Environmental Politics 10, 3, 
74–96. 
Dingwerth, K. and M. Eichinger (2014) ‘Tamed Transparency and the Global Reporting 
Initiative: The Role of Information Infrastructures’, In A. Gupta and M. Mason (eds) 
Transparency and Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press). 
Dryzek, J. S. (1999) ‘Transnational Democracy’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 7, 1, 30-51. 
Dryzek, J. S. and H. Stevenson (2011) ‘Global Democracy and Earth System Governance’, 
Ecological Economics 70, 11, 1865–1874. 
Eckersley, R. (2004) The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press). 
EEA [European Environmental Agency] (2001) ‘Reporting on Environmental Measures: Are we 
Being Effective?’, Environmental Issue Report No. 25 (Copenhagen: European Environmental 
Agency). 
Etzioni, A. (2010) ‘Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 
18, 4, 389–404. 
Fenster, M. (2010) ‘Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor’, Administrative Law Review, 
62, 617. 
Florini, A. (1998) ‘The End of Secrecy’, Foreign Policy No. 111, Summer, 50–63. 
Florini, A. (ed.) (2007) The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press). 
Florini, A. (2008) ‘Making Transparency Work’, Global Environmental Politics 8, 2, 14–16. 
Florini, A. and S. Saleem (2011) ‘Information Disclosure in Global Energy Governance’, Global 
Policy 2, SI, 144–54. 
Forsyth, T. (2003) Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science (London: 
Routledge). 
Fox, J. (2007) ‘The Uncertain Relationship between Transparency and Accountability’, 
Development in Practice 17, 4/5, 663–671. 
Fung, A., M. Graham and D. Weil (2007) Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of 
Transparency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Garcia, J. H., S. Afsah and T. Sterner (2009) ‘What Firms are More Sensitive to Public 
disclosure Schemes for Pollution Control? Evidence from Indonesia’s PROPER Program’, 
Environmental and Resource Economics 42, 2, 151–168. 
George, A. L. and A. Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Gilbert, J. (2007) ‘Public Secrets: “Being-with” in an Era of Perpetual Disclosure’, Cultural 
Studies 21, 1, 22–44. 
Gouldson, A. (2004) ‘Risk, Regulation and the Right to Know: Exploring the Impacts of Access 
to Information on the Governance of Environmental Risk’, Sustainable Development 12, 136–
149. 
Graham, M. (2002) Democracy by Disclosure: The Rise of Technopopulism (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press). 
Grigorescu, A. (2007) ‘Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Roles of Member 
States, International Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental Organizations’, International Studies 
Quarterly 51, 3, 625–648. 
Gupta, A. (2006) ‘Problem Framing in Assessment Processes: The Case of Biosafety’, In 
Mitchell, R. B., W. C. Clark, D. Cash and N. M. Dickson (eds) Global Environmental 
Assessments: Information and Influence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 57–86. 
Gupta, A. (2008) ‘Transparency under Scrutiny: Information Disclosure in Global 
Environmental Governance’, Global Environmental Politics 8, 2, 1–7. 
Gupta, A. (2010a) ‘Transparency to What End? Governing by Disclosure through the Biosafety 
Clearing House’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 28, 1, 128–144. 
Gupta, A. (2010b) ‘Transparency in Global Environmental Governance: A Coming of Age?’, 
Global Environmental Politics 10, 3, 1–9. 
Gupta, A. (2010c) ‘Transparency as Contested Political Terrain: Who Knows What About the 
Global GMO Trade and Why Does it Matter?’, Global Environmental Politics 10, 3, 32–52. 
Gupta, S. and B. Golder (2005) ‘Do Stock markets Penalize Environment-Unfriendly Behavior? 
Evidence from India’, Ecological Economics 52, 1, 81–95. 
Haas, P. (1989) ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution 
Control’, International Organization 43, 3, 377–403. 
Haufler, V. (2010) ‘Disclosure as Governance: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
and Resource Management in the Developing World’, Global Environmental Politics 10, 3, 53–
73. 
Heald, D. (2006) ‘Varieties of Transparency’, In C. Hood and D. Heald (eds) Transparency: the 
Key to Better Governance? (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 25–43. 
Held, D. (2004) ‘Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan 
Perspective’, Government and Opposition 39, 2, 364–391. 
Holmes, A. (2011) ‘The Limits of Carbon Disclosure: Theorizing the Business Case for Investor 
Environmentalism’, Global Environmental Politics 11, 2, 98–119. 
Hood, C. and D. Heald (eds) (2006) Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
Jansen, K. and M. Dubois (2014) ‘Global Pesticide Governance by Disclosure: Prior Informed 
Consent and the Rotterdam Convention’, In A. Gupta and M. Mason (eds) Transparency and 
Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Jasanoff, S. (ed.) (2004) States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order 
(London: Routledge). 
Kathuria, V. (2009) ‘Public Disclosures: Using Information to Reduce Pollution in Developing 
Countries’, Environment, Development and Sustainability 11, 5, 955–970. 
Keohane, R. (2006) ‘Accountability in World Politics’, Scandinavian Political Studies 29, 2, 75–
87. 
Kolk, A., D. Levy and J. Pinkse (2008) ‘Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: 
The Institutionalization and Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure’, European Accounting 
Review 17, 4, 719–745. 
Konar, S. and M. A. Cohen. (1997) ‘Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right 
to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32, 
1, 109–124. 
Knox Hayes, J. and D. Levy (2014) ‘The Political Economy of Governance by Disclosure: 
Carbon Disclosure and Non-Financial Reporting as Contested Fields of Governance’, In A. 
Gupta and M. Mason (eds) Transparency and Global Environmental Governance: Critical 
Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Krämer, L. (2012) ‘Transnational Access to Environmental Information’, Transnational 
Environmental Law 1, 1, 95–104. 
Langlet, D. (2009) Prior Informed Consent and Hazardous Trade (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International). 
Langley, P. (2001) ‘Transparency in the Making of Global Environmental Governance’, Global 
Society 15, 1, 73–92. 
Levy, D. and P. Newell (2005) The Business of Global Environmental Governance (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press). 
Litfin, K. T. (1994) Ozone Discourses, Science and Politics in Global Environmental 
Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press). 
Litfin, K. T. (ed.) (1998) The Greening Sovereignty in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press). 
Lord, K. M. (2006) The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency (New York: SUNY). 
Lyon, T. P. and J. W. Maxwell (2011) ‘Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure and the 
Threat of Audit’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 20, 1, 3–41. 
Mason, M. (2005) The New Accountability: Environmental Responsibility Across Borders 
(London: Earthscan). 
Mason, M. (2008) ‘Transparency for Whom? Information Disclosure and Power in Global 
Environmental Governance’, Global Environmental Politics 8, 2, 8–13. 
Mason, M. (2014) ‘So Far but No Further? Transparency in the Aarhus Convention’, In A. Gupta 
and M. Mason (eds) Transparency and Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Michener, G. and K. Bersch (2011) Conceptualizing the Quality of Transparency. Paper 
prepared for the 1st Global Conference on Transparency, Rutgers University, Newark, 17–20 




Mitchell, R. B. (1998) ‘Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International 
Regimes’, International Studies Quarterly 42, 1, 109–130. 
Mitchell, R. B. (2011) ‘Transparency for Governance: The Mechanisms and Effectiveness of 
Disclosure-based and Education-based Transparency Policies’, Ecological Economics 70, 11, 
1882–1890. 
Mitchell, R. B., W. C. Clark, D. Cash and N. M. Dickson (eds) (2006) Global Environmental 
Assessments: Information and Influence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Mol, A. (2006) ‘Environmental Governance in the Information Age: The Emergence of 
Informational Governance’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 24, 4, 497–
514. 
Mol, A. (2008) Environmental Reform in the Information Age: The Contours of Informational 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Mol, A. (2014) ‘The Lost Innocence of Transparency in Environmental Politics’, In A. Gupta 
and M. Mason (eds) Transparency and Global Environmental Governance: Critical Perspectives 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Newell, P. (2008a) ‘The Political Economy of Global Environmental Governance’, Review of 
International Studies 34, 3, 5–7–529. 
Newell, P. (2008b) ‘The Marketization of Environmental Governance: Manifestations and 
Implications’, In J. Park, K. Conca and M. Finger (eds) The Crisis of Global Environmental 
Governance: Towards a New Political Economy of Sustainability (London and New York: 
Routledge), 77–95. 
Newell, P. and M. Paterson (2010) Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the 
Transformation of the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
O’Neill, O. (2006) ‘Transparency and the Ethics of Communication’, In C. Hood and D. Heald 
(eds) Transparency: the Key to Better Governance? (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 75–90. 
Pattberg, P. and E. Okechukwu (2009) ‘The Business of Transnational Climate Governance: 
Legitimate, Accountable, and Transparent?’, St Anthony’s International Review 5, 1, 76–98. 
Peck, P. and K. Sinding (2003) ‘Environmental and Social Disclosure and data Richness in the 
Mining Industry’, Business Strategy and the Environment 12, 3, 131–146. 
Raab, C. (2008) ‘Review: Transparency: the Key to Better Governance?’, In C. Hood, D. Heald 
(eds) Public Administration 86, 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 591–618. 
Roberts, A. (2002) ‘Multilateral Institutions and the Right to Information: Experience in the 
European Union’, European Public Law 8, 2, 255–275. 
Roberts, A. (2004) ‘A Partial Revolution: The Diplomatic Ethos and Transparency in 
Intergovernmental Organizations’, Public Administration Review 64, 4, 410–424. 
Roberts, A. (2006) ‘Dashed Expectations: Governmental Adaptation to Transparency Rules’, In 
C. Hood and D. Heald (eds) Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 107–125. 
Rowan-Robinson, J., A. Ross, W. Walton and J. Rothnie (1996) ‘Public Access to 
Environmental Information: A Means to What End?’, Journal of European Law 8, 1, 19–42. 
Smith, G. (2003) Deliberative Democracy and the Environment (London: Routledge). 
Soederberg, S. (2001) ‘Grafting Stability onto Globalization? Deconstructing the IMF’s Recent 
Bid for Transparency’, Third World Quarterly 22, 5, 849–864. 
Stasavage, D. (2003) ‘Transparency, Democratic Accountability and the Economic 
Consequences of Monetary Institutions’, American Journal of Political Science 47, 3, 389–402. 
Stephan, M. (2002) ‘Environmental Information Disclosure Programmes: They Work But 
Why?’, Social Science Quarterly 83, 1, 190–205. 
Stevis, D. and V. J. Assetto (eds) (2001) The International Political Economy of the 
Environment: Critical Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). 
van den Burg, S. (2004) ‘Informing or Empowering? Disclosure in the United States and the 
Netherlands’, Local Environment 9, 4, 367–381. 
Weil, D., A. Fung, M. Graham and E. Fagotto (2006) ‘The Effectiveness of Regulatory 
Disclosure Policies’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 25, 1, 155–118. 
Young, O. (ed.) (1999) The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal 
Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Notes 
This chapter draws upon and synthesizes the introductory chapter and main conclusions of a 
recently concluded comprehensive comparative assessment of ‘Transparency in Global 
Environmental Governance’, now forthcoming as an edited volume with MIT Press (Gupta and 
Mason, 2014). 
 
 
